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Abstract  
The study focuses on the impact of United Kingdom’s vote for leaving the European 
Union on the banks stocks in Europe. The tool used for measuring this impact is event 
study. Putting the center of attention on the banking industry, we investigate 63 major 
banks in Europe. Abnormal returns are defined by using the well-known market 
model. As expected, the results show that banks experience significant negative 
abnormal returns. To find what could be the potential factors that have an effect on 
the returns, a linear regression is specified. Its results show that two factors that have 
a significant effect were the size of the bank and its domestic accounts, i.e. its 
orientation towards international markets.  
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1. Introduction 
It is a very rare case a certain event to be of deep interest to people from almost 
every country. Even if it is about elections or referendum, which usually are of 
national or regional importance. However, in the summer of 2016 the whole world 
was nervously following the news stream, the campaign and the odds for a single 
event in the United Kingdom. A referendum was held on 23rd of June asking 
whether the UK should remain or leave the EU. The unknown effects and 
unprecedented procedure of leaving the union that a potential negative outcome of 
the vote could lead to were the main reasons for the high anticipation of it. Some 
of the politicians in Europe have expressed their thoughts and concerns: “We keep 
all our fingers crossed for the Brits to decide to stay in the union,” Per Bolund, 
Sweden’s financial markets minister or Daniel Mulhall, Ireland’s UK ambassador, 
said: “It would be remiss of us not to draw to the attention of Irish people here in 
Britain the implications and the risks we see to British-Irish relations”. 
Furthermore, representatives from large companies admitted possible future 
issues if a negative vote occurs: “That’s not good for companies like ours that thrive 
by there being no barriers” – Ben van Beurden, Chief Executive of Shell. 
On 24th of June the results from the referendum were announced showing that 
the citizens of the United Kingdom have voted for leaving the European Union. 
This decision caused a surprise and the reaction from the markets was 
disappointing. The pound dived to a 30-year low, while the FTSE 100 dropped by 
9% at the beginning of the trading day.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of the referendum vote on 
European banking sector and attempt to explain which factors cause higher 
reaction from banks. We choose a single industry, in order to provide an in-depth 
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analysis and concrete inferences. They research the banking industry due to its 
importance to the national economy. Banks are usually subject to much more 
monitoring and restrictions than other companies. Furthermore, Ramiah, Pham 
and Moosa (2016) proved that banks were one of the most severely affected 
industries by UK referendum vote results with negative abnormal performance. 
In order to investigate the abnormal performance of banks across Europe, we 
use event study methodology. Then we apply the CAR estimates as dependent 
variable in cross-sectional regressions, so as to test if the factors included in the 
regressions can explain the negative abnormal performance. 
The contribution of this thesis is that it analyses a relatively new event, which 
is still not well researched. Despite the big number of issued papers on Brexit topic 
in the past year, most of them emphasize on the withdrawal procedure and how 
would Europe be affected after it. Only few investigate the event in particular. 
Moreover, in times of increasing Euroscepticism, countries should evaluate the 
consequence when considering their options. Therefore, this analysis could be an 
example in their research. On the other hand, the European authorities could learn 
from the topic in case if another country decides to leave.  
 Chapter 2 reveals the existing relevant literature and hypothesis development. 
In Chapter 3 the data selection and the core principles of the methodology used in 
this thesis are shown. Chapter 4 contains the actual results from the applied 
methods and their verbal meaning. Chapter 5 provides the reader with a brief 
overview of the paper and underlines the main inferences. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Theoretical background 
Stock prices reaction to news 
There are a lot of previous studies that analyze the stock performance - whether 
it is predictable, whether it is related to news, etc. In the past, much research 
resulted in the common belief that all in all stock market prices are predictable. 
They seem to have reversal on daily and even on yearly basis, as well as monthly 
drift (Chan, 2001).  
According to Fama (1970), the efficient market price ‘fully reflects’ the 
information that is known on the market. He argues that no empirical implications 
could actually turn this statement into untrue. Fama backed his research by stating 
the sufficient conditions to have capital market efficiency. First condition is the lack 
of transactional cost in trading securities. Second condition is that all market 
participants have all of the available information on the market without paying any 
cost. The last condition is that ‘all agree on the implication of current information 
for the current price and distributions of future prices of each security’. 
Of course, the conditions mentioned above exist in frictionless market that 
could not be found in the real world, but even with some deviations, the conditions 
are enough to ensure the reflection of the information on the security price.  
Even though, the efficient market hypothesis could be used to support the 
research, we are well aware that it is only a hypothesis and could not use it as a real 
proof of impact that information has on prices. However, what Fama (1970) did 
was to investigate this issue by performing weak, semi-strong and strong tests of 
the Efficient Market Model. In the weak and semi-strong test cases, the evidence 
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supports the hypothesis and in the strong test case, the evidence against the EHM 
is very limited.  
Other authors that recently researched the news impact on stock prices are 
Heston and Sinha (2016). They used 900 000 public new stories and investigate 
their impact on the stock prices. The findings support previous literature and 
analyses by revealing that daily news predict stock prices for only 1-2 days. They 
also found that positive news has a positive effect on the stocks, whereas negative 
news has e negative effect.  
For all we know, EHM is still a hypothesis, but the existing evidence in the form 
of different research papers, analyses and literature cannot be overlooked. One way 
or another news has high impact on stock prices. However, different news can hit 
the markets even before they are officially public or known. They can also induce 
positive or negative post-news reaction or they can result in not a single stock 
movement. With that in mind, we will see if the results in our case would support 
the past evidence. 
Reaction of the market to major world events 
 One of the first authors to look over on the stock market reaction after big world 
events is Niederhoffer (1971). According to him, “The most unequivocal pattern of 
influence reported below is that large changes are substantially more likely 
following world events than on randomly selected days.” What is more, he also 
states that significant abnormal performance can be detected on the first and 
second day after a major world event. The author gathered approximately 20 
headlines a year in the period of 1950-1966 and his study was based on 
constructing nineteen event categories which supported by theory and history may 
have a significant impact on stock price performance.   
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Furthermore, Merrill (1966) says “The market has some very bad moments 
immediately following the tragic news. Selling drives prices down to a surprising 
degree. However, when a day has passed, the market recovers from its panic, and 
sometimes works upward to a higher level.” 
There are studies that analyze the effect of particularly economic events on the 
stock price changes. Example for such research is Dangol (2008), where the author 
centers their attention to the stock reaction due to unanticipated political events. 
He founded that negative announcement would likely result in negative abnormal 
performance, as well as good announcements would result in positive abnormal 
performance. The paper is based on eleven commercial banks, listed on Nepal 
Stock Exchange Ltd. covering the period between 2001 and 2006 with total of 81 
observations. Another thing is the division of the events into two groups – bad news 
and good news, and investigating the effect each group has on the banks` stocks. 
The author adopts the market model for calculating the expected normal returns, 
since it was and still is considered as one of the most reliable ones when conducting 
event study with daily data. The study results showed that the abnormal 
performance in the pre-event window is usually significant and positive, while 
during the day t= -1 the abnormal performance is on average positive, but 
insignificant. Furthermore, immediately after the event the abnormal performance 
becomes strongly significant and negative and continued through the following 
four days. Later in the thesis, these findings would prove consistent with the results 
we got as well.  In conclusion, the main finding that was the short-term abnormal 
performance after the event day and the fact that the sign of the effect is the same 
as the news, i.е. good news is „good“ for stocks, bad news are „bad“ for stocks.  
Another related literature is the paper of Mahmood, Irfan, Iqbal, Kamran, 2014. 
The authors use the methodology of an event study to conduct an enquiry into 
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whether major political events have impact on the KSE-100 index returns. They 
focus on 50 significant political events in the period between 1998 and 2013. Their 
findings reveal that some days before and after the event date, negative abnormal 
returns are observed.  
2.2. Previous studies 
Brexit is relatively new for the economic and finance history. That is why there 
are not many papers covering the impact of the event on stock prices. There are 
two main research papers that we used as foundation in developing the thesis.  
First article is conducted by Burdekin, Hughson and Gu (2017) and focuses on 
Brexit impact on global equity markets. The authors use 64 stock exchanges in the 
period of 6th January 2016 and 30th June 2016. Their sample do not emphasize on 
particular industry, region or country. On the contrary, they focus on the equity 
markets as a whole and use data from around 41 countries from Europe, Asia, 
North and South America.  
The authors chose to construct normal expected returns by using the market 
model (something that we chose as well and would become clear later in the thesis). 
According to their raw results, negative abnormal returns are noted on the 24th, 
27th and 28th of June. Moreover, it is shown that although Brexit was considered as 
“bad news” for the world, not every country has experienced negative abnormal 
performance. The authors find it quite normal that the largest negative ARs are 
observed within EU.  For example, the paper demonstrates that the most negatively 
affected by the news are the PIIGS countries with average of -6.64%. On the 
contrary, BRICS countries, Brazil and Russia, show positive abnormal returns of 
5.5% and 5.3% respectively. As far as UK is concerned, the average AR is -4.2%.  
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Following in the research, the authors regress the abnormal returns on a 
constant, the country`s level of openness and indebtedness as they had suspicions 
that not only EU membership could effect on the stock’s price changes. What they 
found was that more open countries suffer less than the others. All in all, the paper 
proves that Brexit had a big negative effect on stock market worldwide, especially 
on the ones in the Eurozone.  
Another directly related study is the one performed by Ramiah, Pham and 
Moosa (2016). They investigate the referendum impact on different sectors in the 
British economy over the period June-July 2016. The method used is again event 
study and what they found is that Brexit has mixed effect depending on the 
particular sector.  
As opposed to most of the prior literature, the authors chose to implement 
CAPM for expected normal returns calculation. For the sake of the analysis, the 
researches construct CAR over the following 10 days after the event. Zero ARs or 
CARs are assumed to be a result one of the following four: (i) Brexit has no impact 
on revenue or cost (ii) the industry is protected (iii) the industry can pass the cost 
to its customers or (iv) “the industry experiences a decline in revenue, which is 
offset by a decline in cost in the form of government subsidy (or vice versa)”. The 
finding of the paper is that Brexit do have an impact on stock returns. The affected 
sectors showed on average significant negative results, meaning that the news was 
bad for UK economy in general.  
One of the authors` hypotheses that is directly related with the thesis` topic is 
based on Financial Times discussion that “Banks have already begun to take action 
to shift operations out of the UK”. That is why one of the theories Ramiah, Pham, 
Moosa are exploring and analyzing, is that Brexit is bad news for the banking 
sector, mainly because of the eventual loosing of passport rights, that are currently 
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responsible for UK financial institutions to perform operations in EU without 
having a physical location. Average ARs for the sector is calculated to be -4.99%, 
with CAR2, CAR5 and CAR10, respectively, -7.81%, -11.90% and – 15.37%. 
In conclusion, the article results showed that banking sector was one of the 
most severely affected by Brexit with negative abnormal performance, proving that 
predictions of Bank of England about changes in short-term systematic risk were 
right.  
The main differences between the underlying thesis and the research papers 
above are: 
(i) We focus on Brexit vote effect only on Europe. 
(ii) We investigate the impact of the referendum in details on the banking 
sector. 
In other words, the ongoing analysis is a combination of the two previous ones 
we found, providing more insights on the European banking industry and its 
reaction to the vote. 
Hypotheses development 
Based on the theory background and previous related literature we formulate three 
hypotheses.  
 
H1: Brexit’s vote was bad news for the banking sector in Europe in short-term period 
 
The hypothesis can be translated as on average, we expect that that there would 
be significant negative abnormal returns in the banking sector. Not only, the prior 
literature shows that abnormal performance is expected, but we also take into account 
the words of modern economist experts. For example, Holger Schmieding, chief 
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economist at Berenberg investment bank, wrote in a recent note the following: “A U.K. 
vote to leave the EU would not be a black swan event. Markets have discussed the risk 
since late 2015 and are unlikely to seize up, as they did in the Lehman crisis” (Oprita, 
A., (2016)). 
 
H2: Brexit’s vote effects worse on UK than other European countries. 
 
The intuition behind this hypothesis is that UK would suffer more consequences 
than the rest of the EU, resulting in lower negative abnormal returns. That is because 
the market conditions and arrangements changes that would happen, are going to be 
situated mainly in UK.  
 In order to find what could be the bank specific factors impacting on the stock 
performance, we construct a cross-sectional regression. We chose five independent 
variables: 
(i) Capadeq – capital adequacy. The data about it was gathered from 
banks` annual reports.  According to (Nzioki, 2011), capital adequacy 
is contributing positively to the profitability of commercial banks, 
which as economic theory implies is directly related with the stock 
price. Therefore, we expect that capital adequacy would have a 
significant effect on the price changes.  
(ii) Debt_TA – debt to total assets ratio is calculated by dividing firm 
total liabilities by its total assets. This ratio is a sign of the financial 
risk the bank is carrying – the lower the ratio, the better off the bank. 
Since there is not much information in the prior literature whether 
debt ratio has an effect on the stock prices, we decide to include it in 
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the cross-sectional regression and see if Nahoji, Abadi, Rafat (2014) 
are right in their results that significant relationship could be 
detected.  
(iii) Size – the variable size is calculated by taking the natural logarithm 
of bank total assets. The information about this could be found in 
banks` financial reports. There is a lot of evidence that proves the 
existing and strong relationship between the firm size and its stock 
returns. For example, Van Dijk (2011) has gathered information 
about many of the previous literature supporting the hypothesis - 
Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), Keim (1983), Lamoureux and 
Sanger (1989), etc. Each of the mentioned papers examines the 
relationship in different time periods, different duration and 
different markets. The common thing between them is they all prove 
that such correlation exists and cannot be ignored. What can be 
expected is that the relationship would be negative, since the bigger 
the banks is, the more affected could it be from the event. (the 
abnormal returns are expected to be negative in general) 
(iv) Domestic_Accounts – this variable is calculated in percentage terms 
by dividing the domestic accounts to total accounts. The lower the 
percentage is, the more internationally oriented the bank is. The 
information is collected from the annual reports of the banks. 
According to Pynnönen (2005) the geographical position could 
interfere with stock prices. Since, the event took place in UK, but is 
affecting not only it, but other countries as well, we decided to check 
if that kind of relation exist. What we expect to find here is that the 
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more domestically oriented a bank is, the smaller the abnormal 
performance there would be.  
(v) ROA – return on assets. The information about the index is collected 
from Thomson Reuters Eikon website. In past literature, there is 
broad evidence that such relation could be found. For instance, Chen 
and Zhang (2010) examine new three-factor model for cross-
sectional returns. The factors they analyze are the market excess 
return, the difference between the return on a portfolio of low-
investment stocks and the return on a portfolio of high-investment 
stocks and ROA. All three of them showed significant, suggesting that 
the assumption was right. Furthermore, Warrad and Al Omari (2013) 
state that ROA has a significant positive effect on stocks. 
Important thing to be mentioned here is that all of the extracted information was 
turned into thousands of GBP. Where the original currency was different from pound 
we used the closing exchange rate of 31st of December 2015, since the annual reports 
we used for data collection are to the same date as well. 
 
H3: All included variables in the CARs regression have significant effect on CAR 
 
Judging by the explanations given about the independent variables above, we 
expect that all of the included variables would have significant effect on the stock 
returns. 
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection 
 The study is based on 63 European banks. They are selected from the STOXX 
Europe TMI banks that originally consist of 73 components. Ten banks were removed 
due to various reasons, making them unsuitable for this analysis.  
 For example, all Swedish banks (total of 6) were excluded, because on 24th June 
Sweden is celebrating “Midsommarstång” and it is a national holiday resulting in no 
trade information on this day.  
 Removed are also KBC Ancora (due to lack of credible information, since their 
financial year starts in June), Banks of Cyprus Holdings, since it is traded in UK, but 
is a Cypriot bank originally. Same goes to BGEO Group, which is originally Georgian 
bank with headquarters in Georgia.  
 Intesa Sanpaolo is also excluded from the sample, since the bank group it is part 
of is already included. The last removed bank is Banque Nationale de Belgique, since 
it is a national bank and has different types of operations and regulations. In order for 
the results to be consistent, the sample used should include similar type of units with 
similar characteristics.  
 In the earlier event studies, most used type of data was monthly. However, with 
technology development, theory and knowledge base, it became natural to use daily 
stock returns (Sorokina, Booth, Thornton, 2013). This is the approach we use as well.  
The basic market index we chose is the EUROSTOXX 50 index. The information about 
it and banks` stock prices is collected through Thomson Reuters database. The 
gathered price data is in thousands of GBP.  
 The time period included is from 1st July 2015 till 30th June 2016. For some of 
the countries there were days that were not trading. We treated the missing values by 
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using one of the four ways suggested by Bartholdy, Olson and Peare (2006). The 
lumped method they showed proved to have consistent results. The model itself uses 
the last available transaction price for the non-trading days. The event window return 
was calculated based on the index availability.   
 Another issue that was encountered was that some of the banks were publicly 
listed later than 1st July 2015. In other words, the number of calendars days is the same 
for each bank, but the number of observations varies, because of the non-trading days 
and lack of public data.  
 In order to make the analysis more efficient and easily understandable, the 
sample was divided into two groups – UK group, consisting of all UK banks from the 
sample and EX UK group, which includes the remaining ones. We also unite the two 
groups and name the whole sample as ALL group. This separation allows us to 
investigate the abnormal performance with and without taking UK into account, 
resulting in gaining more insights on the subject of matter. 
3.2. Event study 
3.2.1. Definition and event study structure 
To conduct the research, event study method is adopted. It is a standard 
financial tool dated back in time used to investigate whether some particular event 
does or does not have an impact on stocks of a particular firm, industry, etc. (Campbell, 
Lo and MacKinlay, 1997) Its application is wide – from mergers and acquisitions and 
financial announcements to law field as well.  
Event study can be conducted in different ways. The authors are following the 
structure given in Campbell and MacKinlay (1997). 
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(i) Define the event of interest 
First step is defining the event of interest. As it was already mentioned in the 
introduction, Brexit vote was chosen, since it is a unique event that does not have 
analogue in the modern economic history. The voting took place on 23rd June, but the 
results came in late on the same day, leading the markets to react on the next trading 
day. That is the reason why 24th June was selected to be event day (“day 0”). 
 
(ii) Identify the period of time 
An example of the time structure of an event study is shown in the picture 
below: 
Figure 1: Even study time-line 
 
In figure 1 the period between days T0 and T1 is the estimation period, which as 
we explained before is L1 = T1 – T0 = 251 days. The period between T2 and T1 is can be 
denoted with L2, i.e. the event period. As we can see from the figure 1 L2 is 3 days in 
the first model and 5 days in the second model. 
 In most of the related literature, the event window is defined in multiple days 
which include the event day and at least the previous and the following trading day.  
Examined are 2 event windows. First one, (-1, +1), is suggested by MacKinlay (1997). 
However, there can be any type of event windows. For example, Kansas (2005) uses (-
3; +3) and Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) use (-5; +5). Longer periods are used for some 
special cases. For example, Cox and Peterson (1994) use (+4; +20). What is more, 
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according to Dangol (2008): “The data present important evidence on the speed of 
adjustment of stock prices to new political information, i.e., in as many as 2 to 3 days 
from the announcement date”. Taking into account all the prior literature mentioned 
above, for our second model, (-4, +4) window is used to capture the effect in longer 
period of time.  
As for identifying the estimation window, the prior literature does not suggest 
unanimously a specific number of days. For example, Cox and Peterson (1994) use 100 
days, Carow and Kane (2002) use 200 days, and Litvak (2007) uses 500 days. 
MacKinlay (1997) suggests 250 days. However, it is common that the estimation 
window is usually around 250 days (average trading year), but not less than 126 days 
(Benninga, 2008). Because of the all mentioned theory, we chose for our analysis 
estimation window of 251 days. Important note that should be made here is that the 
estimation window should not include the event itself. Taking that into account, it is 
preventing from interference in normal performance parameter estimates. 
 
(iii) Selection criteria 
The sample was based on the STOXX Europe TMI banks. As explained before 
used are 63 out of all 74 components of the index.  
 
(iv) Define normal performance  
Afterwards, the normal returns are defined. In general, normal return is the 
return that would be expected if the event did not happen. (Campbell, Lo, Mackinlay, 
1997) A.C. For each bank, the following holds: 
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ARi,t = Ri,t – E [ Ri,t | Xt ], 
where ARi,t is the abnormal return, Ri,t is the actual return and E [ Ri,t | Xt ] is the 
expected normal return for bank i on day t of the event window. Expected normal 
returns can be estimated in different ways. For example, MacKinlay, (1997) suggest 
that the approaches can be grouped in two categories – statistical and economic 
model. The most commonly used statistical models are constant-mean-return model 
and market model. Statistical models have the following properties: (i) do not depend 
on economic conditions (ii) they assume that the asset returns are independently and 
identically distributed through time.  
On the other hand, the economic models do depend on economic arguments, 
but they lack statistical assumptions by default. Most used models in this group are 
CAPM (Capital asset pricing model) model and APT model (Arbitrage pricing theory). 
Previous literature offers different opinions on choosing best model or type of 
approach. For instance, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) imply that simpler methods 
like constant mean model give better results than more sophisticated ones, where 
MacKinlay, (1997) suggests that economic models will give more precise normal 
measurement. He denotes that statistical models dominate, since they eliminate biases 
in economic models, and that the advantage of economic models over the statistical 
ones is not proven. 
In the underlying study, market model is adopted. It is most commonly used 
approach for measuring normal performance. MM assumes stable linear relationship 
between the market prices and stock prices. Advantage of using MM will depend by R-
squared of the regression used for calculating normal expected returns. There will be 
more variance reduction and more gain, when R-squared is higher. In this particular 
case, the average R-squared from all banks` regressions is 35.85%, which shows that 
the market model is a good fit for our data. 
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According to Strong, (1992), calculating the normal return is of crucial 
significance for the successful implementation of the model. That was one of the 
reason why we took seriously choosing the best model suiting the data and went 
thoroughly through prior literature in order to find it. 
There are past studies investigating whether MM is a reliable model. Cable and 
Holland (1999) analyze in their study different models in order to provide more 
insights on choosing specification model. Their results show that regression-based 
models are better in general. They also study the dispute between CAPM and MM. The 
main difference between the given models is that in MM the risk-free rate is 
suppressed. Nonetheless, the market factors stay accounted for in both cases. MM is 
outperforming CAPM, proving valid in twenty-one cases, while CAPM is proven valid 
in only 12 cases, three of which it is preferred to MM. All in all, MM is clearly 
outperforming the other models.  
Another author taking a stand for MM is Sorokina, Booth, and Thornton (2013) 
who states that despite some models perform similar as MM, it stays the most 
commonly used.  
3.2.2. Measuring AR and CAR 
In order to calculate the abnormal return, we use the following formula: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑡), 
Where ARit is the abnormal return, Rit is the actual return in the event window 
and (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the return predicted by the market model. 
Parameters α and β are calculated based on the estimation window data. After 
calculating the parameters, they are used to obtain the abnormal returns. 
𝛽?̂? =
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝜇?̂?)(𝑅𝑚𝜏 − 𝜇?̂?)
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝜏 − 𝜇𝑚)2
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
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𝛼?̂? = 𝜇?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝜇?̂? 
?̂?𝜀𝑡
2 =
1
𝐿1 − 2
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 −
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
𝛼?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡)
2 
where 
           𝜇?̂? =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
       and         𝜇?̂? =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑚𝜏
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
 
 In order to see the overall effect on the bank industry, the abnormal returns can 
be aggregated. Aggregating abnormal returns is widely used technique to get rid of 
some potential problems that may come up when using AR. According to Blume (1971) 
and Gonedes (1973) some of them are cross-sectional correlation in event time, 
different variances across firms, dependent across time for a given firm and greater 
variance during event time than in surrounding periods (Sorokina, Booth, Thornton, 
2013). 
Aggregation could be performed through two dimensions - through securities 
and through time. Following the example of McKinley, first they were aggregated 
through securities, then through time and lastly, through the two dimensions together.  
 Occasionally, some firms could show negative (positive) results when 
investigating abnormal performance, when the other has been expected (Brooks, 
2014). Since, for the aim of this analysis we are interested not in an individual firm, 
but rather on the impact on the whole sample, implemented is aggregating through 
time. It is expressed by finding the average abnormal return (AAR) for each particular 
day of the event window, using the formula below: 
𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂?
𝑁
𝑖=1
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 For the first event window (-1, +1), there are three AARs, and for the (-4, +4) 
event window there are, respectively, nine average abnormal returns.  
 What is more, again according to Brooks, (2014) it is expected that returns can 
have quite a bit variation across the event window days, because of the natural rising 
and falling of prices. Having that in mind, it can be complicated and hard to find some 
unique patterns, etc. To remove this potential issue, aggregating through time is used.  
By aggregating through time, cumulative abnormal returns are obtained. 
McKinley defines sample CAR from t1 to t2, where t1 and t2 are days in the event 
window. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅?̂?(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂?
𝜏=2
𝜏=𝜏1
 
 Since there are two event windows, defined are different CARs for each of them. 
For three days window, calculated are CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (0, +1). For the nine days 
window, we calculate three cumulative abnormal returns – CAR (-4, +4), CAR (-2, +4) 
and CAR (-2, +2).  
3.2.3. Testing AR and CAR 
For the sake of the research, the obtained average abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns should be tested for significance. There are different 
ways that significance can be tested. In general, the testing models can be divided in 
two groups – parametric and non-parametric tests.  
To find if AAR and CAR have significance performance standard t-test is used 
following Brooks. 
Null hypotheses for AR significance and CAR significance – H0: AAR = 0 or 
“The event does not have an impact on the stock prices” 
The formulas for the tAAR and tCAR are given below: 
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𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = √𝑁
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
 
 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
 
Where SCAAR and 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡  are the standard deviations calculated in the event 
window using the whole sample. 
3.2.4. Cross-sectional regression 
Traditional event study approach is implementing cross-sectional regression. It 
is used in order to detect whether and which (usually firm specific) factors have an 
impact on the abnormal performance.  
What we did is estimating two different OLS regressions: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑠
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀 
and 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑠
+ 𝛽4𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀 
The second regression has additional dummy variable Headquarters which takes 
the value of 1 if the bank is situated in UK and 0 otherwise. The aim of the second 
regression is to see the effect on the UK bank industry only. 
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4. Discussion of results 
4.1. Event study results 
The results of the event study are as follows: 
Event window (-1, +1)  
The abnormal returns for each of the tree dates are given in the table below. 
Table 1. The table shows the abnormal returns for ALL, UK and EX UK groups in (-1, 
+1) event window. 
Date ALL EX UK UK 
AR (+1) -3.77% (-5.4938) *** -2.71% (-4.8512) *** -11.06% (-4.1539) *** 
AR (0) -3.72% (-5.6724) *** -3.51% (-5.5642) *** -5.18% (-1.8218) * 
AR (-1) 0.70% (2.8253) *** 0.88% (3,2728) *** -0.48% (-1.0028) 
 
Where with *** is denoted significance at 1%, with ** - at 5% and with * - at 10%. 
 
From the table, it can be seen that for the group ALL and group EX UK all AR are 
significant at 1% which shows that the impact of the news Britain leaving the UK was 
powerful enough. What is more, AR (0) and AR (+1) are negative showing that the 
news resulted in lower returns for the banks. As for group UK, the results show that 
all three abnormal returns are negative, but only one AR is significant – the one at 27 
June. However, this may be a result from slow reacting markets in UK.  
The average abnormal return for ALL banks is -2.26%. It is negative and significant 
as expected. In group EX UK, we have average negative abnormal return of -1.78%. 
Analyzing only UK banks it can be seen that the average AR is -5.58%. The largest ARs 
for EX UK group and ALL group are found on 24 June, which means the market 
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reacted instantly. As for UK group, the largest AR can be observed on 27 June and 
takes the value of -11.06%.  
For measuring the overall effect, CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (0, +1) are calculated. The 
table below shows the values for all three groups. The numbers in the brackets 
represent the t-test values. 
Table 2. The table shows the cumulative abnormal returns for ALL, UK and EX UK 
groups in (-1, +1) event window. 
Date ALL EX UK UK 
CAR (0, +1) -7.67% (-6.697956) *** -6.22% (-6.99888) *** -17.63% (-3.05501) *** 
CAR (-1, +1) -6.88% (-6.429315) *** -5.34% (-7.08686) *** -17.43% (-3.10745) *** 
 
Where with *** is denoted significance at 1%, with ** - at 5% and with * - at 10%. 
 
From the table, it is observable that all CARs for all groups are significant at 1%.  
Moreover, all of them are negative as expected. Average CAR for group ALL is 
significant and takes the values of -7.27%. For group EX UK banks, we have average 
CAR of -5.78% and for the UK group average CAR is -17.53%. Largest CARs are 
observed in the UK group which leads to conclusion that the effect of Brexit is highest 
in UK banks. 
Event window (-4, +4) 
In the same way the results for event window (-4, +4) are analyzed. 
The calculated ARs are presented in the table below with their t-test statistics, 
respectively.  
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Table 3. The table shows the abnormal returns for ALL, UK and EX UK groups in (-4, 
+4) event window. 
AR ALL EX UK UK 
AR (+4) -0.51% (-2.2500) ** -0.43% (-1.9641) ** -1.05% (-1.0639) 
AR (+3) -1.01% (-2.6652) *** -1.42% (-3.6917) * 1.82% (1.9600) *** 
AR (+2) 0.93% (2.4838) ** 0.63% (1.7263) *** 2.97% (2.1098) ** 
AR (+1) -3.78% (-5.5213) *** -2.71% (-4.8348) * -11.13% (-4.1584) *** 
AR (0) -3.91% (-5.6292) *** -3.49% (-5.5483) * -6.79% (-2.0203) ** 
AR (-1) 0.80% (3.2891) *** 0.87% (3.2676) * -0.28% (-0.5361)  
AR (-2) 0.46% (3.2662) *** 0.36% (2.5069) ** 1.12% (2.5237) ** 
AR (-3) -0.17% (-0.8194) -0.13% (-0.5785)  -0.41% (-0.9704) 
AR (-4) 0.33% (1.0567) -0.06% (-0.1923) 3.00% (3.7390) *** 
 
Where with *** is denoted significance at 1%, with ** - at 5% and with * - at 10%. 
 
The table above is showing that for ALL group and EX UK group there are 
significant abnormal returns from day -2 to day +4. Almost all of the ARs in ALL group 
are significant at 1% level, while in the EX UK group the significance is not that strong 
– 10% on average.  The average ARs for the event period for each of the groups are as 
follows: group ALL - -0.76%, group EX UK - -0.71% and UK group - -1.13%. Once again, 
it is obvious that the impact for UK banks is more powerful than for rest of the included 
European banks.  
The largest ARs observed are for days 0 and +1.  
When taking into account the overall effect of the event, we calculated three 
different cumulative abnormal returns – CAR (-4, +4), CAR (-2, +2) and CAR (-2. +4). 
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The results are given in the table below. They represent the particular CAR and its t-
test statics given in parentheses.  
Table 4. The table shows the cumulative abnormal returns for ALL, UK and EX UK 
groups in (-4, +4) event window. 
CAR ALL  EX UK UK 
CAR (-4. +4) -6.86% (-7.13415) *** -6.38% (-6.76949) * -10.19% (-2.4562) ** 
CAR (-2, +2) -5.51% (-5.94778) *** -4.34% (-6.15477) * -13.54% (-3.0257) *** 
CAR (-2, +4) -7.03% (-7.13195 *** -6.19% (-7.13162) * -12.78% (-2.5735) ** 
 
Where with *** is denoted significance at 1%, with ** - at 5% and with * - at 10%. 
 
As it can be seen all of the CARs for each group are strongly negative and 
significant. Again, for group UK we have the most negative values. The average CAR 
for ALL group is -6.47%; for EX UK group, it is -5.64%; and for UK group it is -12.17%. 
Another thing that could be seen is that abnormal returns in both cases are similar 
but do not match exactly. The reason behind this is that because of the different even 
windows, the estimation window changes as well. Because of that the regression 
conducted on the market model results in different OLS estimators – alpha and beta 
and that way lead to slightly different abnormal returns. 
All in all, the results for both event windows show that the whole sample has on 
average negative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. This statement 
supports the first of our hypotheses, e.g. “On average, there are significant negative 
AR/CAR for all banks in Europe”. Drawing the inferences for ALL group it is clearly 
visible that Brexit impacted in a bad way on the stock prices in the bank sector. For the 
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3-day event window we have abnormal performance of -2.26% for AR and -7.27% for 
CAR. Taking all this in to account, we can say that we cannot reject H1.  
As it can be seen, no matter the size of the event window, the inferences remain the 
same for the three groups. In order to deal with the second hypothesis, we move the 
focus directly on the UK group. It has strongly significant and negative abnormal 
performance. They are the largest among the three groups, which supports the second 
of our hypotheses – “AR/CAR bigger for UK than for rest of Europe”. Our conclusion, 
supports the conclusions made by Ramiah, Pham and Moosa (2016). Their result of 
abnormal performance of -15.37% in the banking sector is similar to the ones we 
calculated. The small difference both studies have may come from the different type of 
model used for calculating the expected normal returns, as well as, from the size of the 
samples used. In this study, we only chose 8 of the biggest UK banks, so the inferences 
made cannot be entirely the same. 
4.2. Cross-sectional regression results 
Based on the two event windows, we estimated 10 different regressions. The 
two models used were showed in the previous chapter – one of them including 5 
independent variables and the other one with the additional dummy variable. 
Event window (-1, +1)  
For this event window, we estimated 4 regressions – two for each of the two 
main models. First model uses CAR (-1, +1) as dependent variable and the second one 
using CAR (0, -1). For each of them, we also run additional regression with dummy 
variable Headquarter. We decided to estimate both regressions, since for this 
particular event window, abnormal performance is visible on day 0 and after it. So, in 
order to catch the whole effect, as well as the strongest one, we chose to do two 
regressions. 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(0, +1) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝜀 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(0, +1) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀 
      Table 5. The table shows the regression outputs for regression 1 and 2 with dependent 
variables respectively CAR (0; +1) and CAR (-1; +1) 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
Dependent variable CAR (0; +1) CAR (-1; +1) 
Variable Coefficient(t-stat) Coefficient(t-stat) 
C 0.175570(0.5845) 0.151152(0.6168) 
CAPADEQ -0.032209(0.9500) -0.380095(0.4329) 
DEBT/TA -0.021513(0.9464) 0.028357(0.9250) 
DOMESTIC ACCOUNTS -0.097393(0.0749) * -0.079427(0.1214) 
ROA 2.106254(0.2988) 2.365752(0.2158) 
SIZE -0.014388(0.1444) -0.012678(0.1712) 
   
R-squared 0.136531 0.124291 
Adjusted R-squared 0.060788 0.047474 
F-statistic 1.802552 1.618021 
Prob(F-stat) 0.126911 0.169968 
 
As it can be seen from the tables above, in the first regression there is only one 
significant independent variable – DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS. At 10% significance. 
Unfortunately, in Regression 2, none of the independent variables are significant. 
These results could mean two things – first, the chosen independent variables are 
 
 
33 
 
not actually impacting on the abnormal performance, or the window we chose for 
calculating the cumulative abnormal returns is not right. However, in the 3-day 
event window, we did find strong sings for abnormal performance. What is more, 
the CAR windows are the only one we can actually construct in this event window. 
So, we can assume that for this short-term event window the banks` specific factors 
that were chosen for independent variables, are not responsible for the movement 
of the stock returns. 
On the other hand, we explore the specific effect on the UK banks by including 
in the lattes two regression the dummy variable Headquarter. 
       Table 6. The table shows the regression outputs for regression 1 and 2 with dependent 
variables respectively CAR (0; +1) and CAR (-1; +1) with dummy variable Headquarters 
 Regression 1.1 Regression 2.1 
Dependent variable CAR (0; +1)  CAR (-1; +1)  
Variable Coefficient(t-stat) Coefficient(t-stat) 
C 0.255732(0.3956) 0.237090(0.3904) 
CAPADEQ 0.216142(0.6566) -0.113847(0.7983) 
DEBT/TA -0.124750(0.6780) -0.082320(0.7650) 
DOMESTIC ACCOUNTS -0.105103(0.0405) ** -0.087692(0.0614) * 
HEADQUARTER -0.105214(0.0031) *** -0.112796(0.0006) *** 
ROA -0.028835(0.9885) 0.076802(0.9667) 
SIZE -0.013348(0.1468) -0.011564(0.1699) 
   
R-squared 0.262517 0.290120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.183501 0.214061 
F-statistic 3.322328 3.814422 
Prob(F-stat) 0.007200 0.002949 
 
Here we find that for both regressions there are two significant independent 
variables – DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS and HEADQUARTER, where 
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS is significant at 5% in Regression 1.1 and at 10% in 
Regression 2.1, and HEADQUARTER is significant at 1% significance level in both 
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cases. What is more, in the regressions that include the dummy variable, R-squared 
is higher than in the ones that do now, showing the good fit of the data.  
Event window (-4, +4) 
For the other event window, we conduct 3 regressions for each of the two main 
models.  First one uses CAR (-2, 2) as dependent variable, second one uses CAR (-4, 
4) and last one uses CAR (-2, 4).  The intuition behind these CARs is one to capture 
the effect for the whole event window (CAR (-4, 4)), one to capture the short-term 
effect close to day 0 (CAR (-2, 2)) and one to capture the effect mostly after the event 
date, since the days after it show abnormal performance (CAR (-2, 4)). 
For each of the three regressions, we run additional one with including the dummy 
variable Headquarter. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, +2) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑠 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−4, +4) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, +4) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑠 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, +2) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅(−4, +4) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
+𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, +4) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
+𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀  
 
       Table 7. The table shows the regression outputs for regression 1 and 2 with dependent 
variables respectively CAR (-4; +4), CAR (-2; +4) and CAR (-2; +2) 
 
Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Dependent variable CAR (-4; +4) CAR (-2; +4) CAR (-2; +2) 
Variable Coefficient(t-stat) Coefficient(t-stat) Coefficient(t-stat) 
C 0.024352(0.9218) -0.002877(0.9905) 0.089683(0.7287) 
CAPADEQ 0.334655(0.4012) 0.037482(0.9232) -0.250212(0.5463) 
DEBT/TA 0.171759(0.4886) 0.259762(0.2857) 0.109395(0.6717) 
DOMESTIC ACCOUNTS -0.109832(0.0105) ** -0.108172(0.100) *** -0.063375(0.1484) 
ROA 1.972118(0.2095) 3.286339(0.0348) ** 1.834450(0.2619) 
SIZE -0.019503(0.0121) ** -0.021485(0.0050) *** -0.014961(0.0613) * 
    
R-squared 0.268532 0.332794 0.142675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204368 0.274267 0.067471 
F-statistic 4.185092 5.686184 1.897178 
Prob(F-stat) 0.002619 0.000254 0.109059 
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From the results above, it can be seen that for Regression 3, there are two 
significant independent variables at 5% DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS and SIZE. For 
Regression 4, there are 3 significant independent variables - DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS 
at 1%, ROA at 5% and SIZE at 1% as well. For the last regression, 5, only SIZE is 
significant at 10% significance level. Results above lead us to assume that, SIZE is the 
independent variable that has the biggest effect on the abnormal performance, while 
the other two have smaller impact when the dependent variable changes. 
 To find the specific UK effect, we estimate three more regressions with dummy 
variable Headquarter. 
Table 8. The table shows the regression outputs for regression 1 and 2 with dependent 
variables respectively CAR (-4; +4), CAR (-2; +4) and CAR (-2; +2) with dummy variable 
Headquarters 
 
Regression 3.1 Regression 4.1 Regression 5.1 
Dependent variable CAR (-4; +4)  CAR (-2; +4)  CAR (-2; +2)  
Variable Coefficient(t-stat) Coefficient(t-stat) Coefficient(t-stat) 
C 0.034141(0.8917) 0.021766(0.9286) 0.150883(0.0.5370) 
CAPADEQ 0.364982(0.3702) 0.113827(0.7721) -0.060606(0.8780) 
DEBT/TA 0.159153(0.5265) 0.228026(0.3496) 0.030577(0.9003) 
DOMESTIC ACCOUNTS -0.110773(0.0106) ** -0.110542(0.0085) *** -0.069261(0.0947) * 
HEADQUARTERS -0.012848(0.6530) -0.032344(0.2448) -0.080327(0.0053) *** 
ROA 1.711394(0.3092) 2.629994(0.1089) 0.204394(0.9002) 
SIZE -0.019376(0.0133) ** -0.021166(0.0056) *** -0.014167(0.0598) * 
    
R-squared 0.271191 0.348861 0.254913 
Adjusted R-squared 0.193104 0.279096 0.175083 
F-statistic 3.472951 5.000529 3.193175 
Prob(F-stat) 0.005471 0.000365 0.009117 
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Looking at the table above, we can see that Size and Domesitc_Accounts are 
significant in all three cases. What is more, Headquarter is significant in Regression 
5.1 at 1% significance level.  
In general, what these results mean is that Capadeq, Debt_TA and ROA were 
not significant in none of the 10 regressions. This directly rejects H3: “All included 
variables in the regression have significant effect on the CAR”. The strongest impact 
of all, was the one of Size. What is more, the negative parameter it has in all cases show 
that the smaller the bank is, the smaller the magnitude of its stock reaction is when 
facing economic news, similar to Brexit. This is consistent with economic theory, 
because the bigger the bank is, the more transactions and services it performs, the 
higher the relation between stock and the market conditions is. The intuition behind 
this is that bigger banks could possibly have more influence on the whole banking 
industry, as well as having more foreign and international transactions, thus have 
higher stock price synchronicity with the market and so on. 
Another independent variable that is significant in 8 out of 10 times is 
Domestic_Accounts. The sign of its parameter is always negative as well, showing the 
negative effect, it has on the abnormal performance. The economic intuition behind it 
is that the more domestic accounts a bank has, the more unresponsive to international 
news it is.  
As far as the dummy variable are concerned, Headquarter is significant at 1% 
significance level in regressions 1.1, 2.1 and 5.1 The coefficients calculated are on 
average -0.1% which means that Car will decrease with 0.1% if everything else stays 
the same. As we can see, the R-squared of the regressions that have dummy variable 
are higher than the once that do not, which suggests that the model is correctly 
specified this way. 
 
 
38 
 
One thing that should be clarified is that the results from the regression depend 
on the event window. Possible intuition behind this is that in a longer event window, 
some firm-specific news could alter the results and impact the cumulative abnormal 
returns in a different way. 
Comparing our results with Burdekin, Hughson, Gu (2017), we can see that 
overall the results are consistent with each other. The main difference is that what they 
found is that the most affected are PIIGS countries, which is not the case in our 
findings. The intuition behind the dissimilarity is that we did include only one Irish 
bank and no Greek banks in the sample. Working with limited sample size, it is normal 
that the results are quite different, because of the unaccounted information. 
As far as the paper of Ramiah, Pham, Moosa (2016) is concerned, we find that 
our results are consistent with theirs. The difference is only in the value of the 
abnormal performance. This could be a results of different sample size, different 
approach in estimating the expected normal returns or different event window. All in 
all, the thesis is proven to be consistent to some extent with the previous two papers. 
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5. Conclusion  
In conclusion, the thesis analyzes the effect of Brexit vote on the stock returns 
in the banking sector in Europe. Our findings show that as expected the event has on 
average negative significant impact on the banks` stock prices. For the sample 63 
banks from the STOXX TMI Banks index were chosen for the sample. For the sake of 
the research, the sample was divided in two groups – UK group, consisting of 8 banks 
and EX UK group, including the rest of the 63. The analysis show that UK experienced 
more severe abnormal performance than the rest of the European countries used in 
the sample, which resulted in abnormal return of -17.53% in the 3-day event window 
and abnormal return of -12.17% in the 9-day event window.  
However, while investigating the problem, we found out that not only United 
Kingdom, but the rest of Europe was affected as well. The impact was not as negative 
as with UK, but still significant, resulting in the following abnormal performance: -
6.47% and -7.27% for ALL group in the different windows, respectively 3-day and 9-
day.), -5.64% and – 5.78% for the EX UK group. These results show that the main 
driver for the whole banking sector was the UK banks. What is more, the findings lead 
to the inference that the impact was harsher during the first 1-2 days after the event, 
which supported the statement made in Dangol (2008). By constructing a cross-
sectional regression with different cumulative abnormal returns, we found that two 
out of the five proposed factors were significant. Bank`s size and the percentage of 
domestic accounts were proven negative related to stock returns.  
The contribution that our thesis has to prior literature is that it follows relatively 
new and unknown event in the economic history. It also builds on the previous studies 
we investigate, since it narrows the research down to one sector only, but at the same 
time considers not only the effect on UK, but rather on Europe as a whole. The paper 
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could offer to the prior literature valuable insights and give an example what could be 
expected in future events similar to the referendum in United Kingdom.  
One of the biggest limitation that the thesis has is the small number of banks in 
the UK Group. This is a result of the small number of independent listed UK banks, 
because of high consolidation. Bearing that in mind, the reader should be aware that 
even though the results show strong enough evidence for abnormal performance, we 
cannot guarantee high reliability. Furthermore, we chose not to include Greek banks, 
since the events happening in the country in the past few years could possibly bias the 
overall results.  
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Appendix A: List of banks included in the study 
1. HSBC 33. SKANDIABANKEN 
2. LLOYDS 34. SPAREBANKEN 1 NORD NORGE 
3. BARCLAYS 35. SPAREBANKEN MORE 
4. STANDARD CHARTERED 36. ING 
5. ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND 37. ABN AMRO 
6. CYBG 38. DANSKE 
7. METRO BANK 39. JYSKE 
8. VIRGIN MONEY HOLDINGS 40. SYDBANK 
9. UNICREDIT 41. RINKJOBING 
10. MEDIOBANCA 42. BNP PARIBAS 
11. BANCO BPM 43. GRP SOCIETE GENERALE 
12. UBI BCA 44. CREDIT AGRICOLE 
13. FINECOBANK 45. NATIXIS 
14. BPER BANCA 46. CICA 
15. INTESA SANPAOLO RNC 47. DEUTSCHE BANK 
16. BCA POPOLARE 48. COMMERZBANK 
17. CREDITO EMILIANO 49. UBS 
18. CREDITO VALTELLINESE 50. CREDIT SUISSE 
19. BCO SANTANDER 51. JULIUS BAER 
20. BCO BILBAO 52. CEMBRA MONEY 
21. CAIXABANK 53. CANTONALE VAUDOISE 
22. BCO SABADELL 54. VALIANT 
23. BANKINTER 55. VONTOBEL 
24. BANKIA 56. LUZERNER 
25. BCO POPULAR 57. ST GALLER 
26. BCO COMERCIAL 58. GRAUBUENDER 
27. BCO BPI 59. ERSTE GROUP BANK 
28. BANK OF IRELAND 60. RAIFFEISEN 
29. DNB 61. KBC GROUP 
30. SPAREBANK 1 SRBANK 62. KOMERCNI BANKA 
31. NOR FINANS 63. MONETA MONEY BANK 
32. SPAREBANKEN 1 SMN  
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Appendix B: Cross-sectional regression estimation outputs 
1. Regression 1 – CAR (-1, 1) in 3-day event window 
 
 
2. Regression 2 – CAR (0, 1) in 3-day event window 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 15:11
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.237090 0.273893 0.865631 0.3904
CAPADEQ -0.113847 0.443330 -0.256801 0.7983
DEBT_TA -0.082320 0.274016 -0.300419 0.7650
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.087692 0.045937 -1.908949 0.0614
ROA 0.076802 1.829914 0.041970 0.9667
SIZE -0.011564 0.008316 -1.390447 0.1699
HEADQUARTERS -0.112796 0.031186 -3.616858 0.0006
R-squared 0.290120     Mean dependent var -0.068762
Adjusted R-squared 0.214061     S.D. dependent var 0.084889
S.E. of regression 0.075257     Akaike info criterion -2.231373
Sum squared resid 0.317164     Schwarz criterion -1.993247
Log likelihood 77.28824     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.137717
F-statistic 3.814422     Durbin-Watson stat 1.845977
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002949
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 15:09
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.151152 0.300390 0.503186 0.6168
CAPADEQ -0.380095 0.481282 -0.789755 0.4329
DEBT_TA 0.028357 0.299775 0.094596 0.9250
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.079427 0.050509 -1.572520 0.1214
ROA 2.365752 1.890225 1.251572 0.2158
SIZE -0.012678 0.009149 -1.385701 0.1712
R-squared 0.124291     Mean dependent var -0.068762
Adjusted R-squared 0.047474     S.D. dependent var 0.084889
S.E. of regression 0.082850     Akaike info criterion -2.053181
Sum squared resid 0.391253     Schwarz criterion -1.849073
Log likelihood 70.67521     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.972905
F-statistic 1.618021     Durbin-Watson stat 1.715804
Prob(F-statistic) 0.169968
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 13:13
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.175570 0.319210 0.550014 0.5845
CAPADEQ -0.032209 0.511436 -0.062977 0.9500
DEBT_TA -0.021513 0.318557 -0.067532 0.9464
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.097393 0.053674 -1.814542 0.0749
ROA 2.106254 2.008652 1.048591 0.2988
SIZE -0.014388 0.009722 -1.479828 0.1444
R-squared 0.136531     Mean dependent var -0.076661
Adjusted R-squared 0.060788     S.D. dependent var 0.090845
S.E. of regression 0.088041     Akaike info criterion -1.931646
Sum squared resid 0.441815     Schwarz criterion -1.727538
Log likelihood 66.84684     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.851369
F-statistic 1.802552     Durbin-Watson stat 1.740231
Prob(F-statistic) 0.126911
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 15:57
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.255732 0.298753 0.855997 0.3956
CAPADEQ 0.216142 0.483568 0.446973 0.6566
DEBT_TA -0.124750 0.298887 -0.417381 0.6780
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.105103 0.050107 -2.097579 0.0405
ROA -0.028835 1.996006 -0.014446 0.9885
SIZE -0.013348 0.009071 -1.471450 0.1468
HEADQUARTERS -0.105214 0.034017 -3.093001 0.0031
R-squared 0.262517     Mean dependent var -0.076661
Adjusted R-squared 0.183501     S.D. dependent var 0.090845
S.E. of regression 0.082088     Akaike info criterion -2.057615
Sum squared resid 0.377351     Schwarz criterion -1.819489
Log likelihood 71.81488     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.963959
F-statistic 3.322328     Durbin-Watson stat 1.808071
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007200
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3. Regression 3 – CAR (-2, 2) in 9-day event window 
 
 
4. Regression 4 – CAR (-4, 4) in 9-day event window 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 13:48
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.150883 0.242895 0.621188 0.5370
CAPADEQ -0.060606 0.393155 -0.154153 0.8780
DEBT_TA 0.030577 0.243004 0.125830 0.9003
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.069261 0.040738 -1.700146 0.0947
ROA 0.204394 1.622808 0.125951 0.9002
SIZE -0.014167 0.007375 -1.920947 0.0598
HEADQUARTERS -0.080327 0.027657 -2.904430 0.0053
R-squared 0.254913     Mean dependent var -0.055064
Adjusted R-squared 0.175083     S.D. dependent var 0.073482
S.E. of regression 0.066740     Akaike info criterion -2.471595
Sum squared resid 0.249434     Schwarz criterion -2.233469
Log likelihood 84.85524     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.377939
F-statistic 3.193175     Durbin-Watson stat 1.758190
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009117
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 13:34
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.089683 0.257278 0.348583 0.7287
CAPADEQ -0.250212 0.412210 -0.607001 0.5463
DEBT_TA 0.109395 0.256752 0.426071 0.6717
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.063375 0.043260 -1.464968 0.1484
ROA 1.834450 1.618944 1.133115 0.2619
SIZE -0.014961 0.007836 -1.909240 0.0613
R-squared 0.142675     Mean dependent var -0.055064
Adjusted R-squared 0.067471     S.D. dependent var 0.073482
S.E. of regression 0.070959     Akaike info criterion -2.363025
Sum squared resid 0.287009     Schwarz criterion -2.158917
Log likelihood 80.43527     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.282748
F-statistic 1.897178     Durbin-Watson stat 1.713717
Prob(F-statistic) 0.109059
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:31
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.034141 0.249620 0.136771 0.8917
CAPADEQ 0.364982 0.404040 0.903330 0.3702
DEBT_TA 0.159153 0.249732 0.637294 0.5265
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.110773 0.041866 -2.645896 0.0106
ROA 1.711394 1.667740 1.026176 0.3092
SIZE -0.019376 0.007579 -2.556385 0.0133
HEADQUARTERS -0.012848 0.028422 -0.452042 0.6530
R-squared 0.271191     Mean dependent var -0.068629
Adjusted R-squared 0.193104     S.D. dependent var 0.076355
S.E. of regression 0.068588     Akaike info criterion -2.416973
Sum squared resid 0.263438     Schwarz criterion -2.178847
Log likelihood 83.13464     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.323317
F-statistic 3.472951     Durbin-Watson stat 1.907344
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005471
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:35
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.002877 0.241542 -0.011909 0.9905
CAPADEQ 0.037482 0.386998 0.096852 0.9232
DEBT_TA 0.259762 0.241048 1.077635 0.2857
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.108172 0.040614 -2.663392 0.0100
ROA 3.286339 1.519924 2.162173 0.0348
SIZE -0.021485 0.007357 -2.920447 0.0050
R-squared 0.332794     Mean dependent var -0.070267
Adjusted R-squared 0.274267     S.D. dependent var 0.078201
S.E. of regression 0.066619     Akaike info criterion -2.489252
Sum squared resid 0.252974     Schwarz criterion -2.285144
Log likelihood 84.41144     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.408975
F-statistic 5.686184     Durbin-Watson stat 1.998551
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000254
ent Variable: CAR
t : Least Squares
ate: 08/02/17   Time: 15:39
Sa ple: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.024352 0.246937 0.098615 0.9218
CAPADEQ 0.334655 0.395641 0.845855 0.4012
DEBT_TA 0.171759 0.246432 0.696986 0.4886
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.109832 0.041521 -2.645188 0.0105
ROA 1.972118 1.553870 1.269165 0.2095
SIZE -0.019503 0.007521 -2.593064 0.0121
R-squared 0.268532     Mean dep ndent var -0.068629
Adjusted R- quared .204368     S.D. dependent var 0.076355
.E. of regression 0.068107     Akaike info criterion -2.4 5076
Sum square  resid 0.264399     Schwarz crite ion -2.240968
Log likelihood 83.01991     Ha nan-Quinn criter. -2.364800
F-statistic 4.185092     Durbin-Watson stat 1.926141
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002619
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5. Regression 5 – CAR (-2, 4) in 9-day event window 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Cross-sectional regression tests 
White`s test of heteroscedasticity 
1. Regression 1 – CAR (-1, 1) in 3-day event window 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 0.319665     Prob. F(5,57) 0.8991
Obs*R-squared 1.718387     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.8866
Scaled explained SS 3.971610     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.5535
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 15:09
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.021458 0.029969 -0.716020 0.4769
CAPADEQ^2 -0.019155 0.299470 -0.063964 0.9492
DEBT_TA^2 0.035419 0.031896 1.110458 0.2715
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__^2 0.002544 0.008155 0.311977 0.7562
ROA^2 0.698055 11.11780 0.062787 0.9502
SIZE^2 -2.64E-05 7.57E-05 -0.349390 0.7281
R-squared 0.027276     Mean dependent var 0.006210
Adjusted R-squared -0.058051     S.D. dependent var 0.014876
S.E. of regression 0.015302     Akaike info criterion -5.431271
Sum squared resid 0.013347     Schwarz criterion -5.227163
Log likelihood 177.0850     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.350994
F-statistic 0.319665     Durbin-Watson stat 1.771005
Prob(F-statistic) 0.899149
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:34
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.021766 0.241648 0.090073 0.9286
CAPADEQ 0.113827 0.391138 0.291015 0.7721
DEBT_TA 0.228026 0.241757 0.943202 0.3496
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.110542 0.040529 -2.727464 0.0085
ROA 2.629994 1.614483 1.629001 0.1089
SIZE -0.021166 0.007337 -2.884646 0.0056
HEADQUARTERS -0.032344 0.027515 -1.175505 0.2448
R-squared 0.348861     Mean dependent var -0.070267
Adjusted R-squared 0.279096     S.D. dependent var 0.078201
S.E. of regression 0.066397     Akaike info criterion -2.481882
Sum squared resid 0.246882     Schwarz criterion -2.243756
Log likelihood 85.17927     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.388226
F-statistic 5.000529     Durbin-Watson stat 1.970719
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000365
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:35
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.002877 0.241542 -0.011909 0.9905
CAPADEQ 0.037482 0.386998 0.096852 0.9232
DEBT_TA 0.259762 0.241048 1.077635 0.2857
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.108172 0.040614 -2.663392 0.0100
ROA 3.286339 1.519924 2.162173 0.0348
SIZE -0.021485 0.007357 -2.920447 0.0050
R-squared 0.332794     Mean dependent var -0.070267
Adjusted R-squared 0.274267     S.D. dependent var 0.078201
S.E. of regression 0.066619     Akaike info criterion -2.489252
Sum squared resid 0.252974     Schwarz criterion -2.285144
Log likelihood 84.41144     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.408975
F-statistic 5.686184     Durbin-Watson stat 1.998551
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000254
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2. Regression 2 – CAR (0, 1) in 3-day event window 
 
3. Regression 3 – CAR (-2, 2) in 9-day event window 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 0.235058     Prob. F(5,57) 0.9455
Obs*R-squared 1.272759     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.9377
Scaled explained SS 3.453805     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.6304
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 13:14
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.021347 0.036803 -0.580035 0.5642
CAPADEQ^2 0.005354 0.367758 0.014558 0.9884
DEBT_TA^2 0.037127 0.039169 0.947866 0.3472
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__^2 0.001877 0.010014 0.187448 0.8520
ROA^2 -0.217809 13.65298 -0.015953 0.9873
SIZE^2 -3.17E-05 9.29E-05 -0.341459 0.7340
R-squared 0.020203     Mean dependent var 0.007013
Adjusted R-squared -0.065745     S.D. dependent var 0.018202
S.E. of regression 0.018791     Akaike info criterion -5.020450
Sum squared resid 0.020127     Schwarz criterion -4.816342
Log likelihood 164.1442     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.940174
F-statistic 0.235058     Durbin-Watson stat 1.913108
Prob(F-statistic) 0.945491
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 0.328758     Prob. F(5,57) 0.8936
Obs*R-squared 1.765895     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.8805
Scaled explained SS 2.505318     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.7757
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 13:34
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.016694 0.017217 -0.969614 0.3363
CAPADEQ^2 0.042194 0.172047 0.245246 0.8071
DEBT_TA^2 0.019747 0.018324 1.077667 0.2857
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__^2 0.001996 0.004685 0.426096 0.6716
ROA^2 2.404095 6.387241 0.376390 0.7080
SIZE^2 1.58E-05 4.35E-05 0.363885 0.7173
R-squared 0.028030     Mean dependent var 0.004556
Adjusted R-squared -0.057230     S.D. dependent var 0.008550
S.E. of regression 0.008791     Akaike info criterion -6.539761
Sum squared resid 0.004405     Schwarz criterion -6.335653
Log likelihood 212.0025     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.459484
F-statistic 0.328758     Durbin-Watson stat 1.742608
Prob(F-statistic) 0.893571
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4. Regression 4 – CAR (-4, 4) in 9-day event window 
 
5. Regression 5 – CAR (-2, 4) in 9-day event window 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 1.027263     Prob. F(6,56) 0.4174
Obs*R-squared 6.246507     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.3962
Scaled explained SS 5.254453     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.5116
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:22
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.002832 0.012098 0.234082 0.8158
CAPADEQ^2 -0.173693 0.120614 -1.440068 0.1554
DEBT_TA^2 0.005044 0.012806 0.393885 0.6952
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__^2 0.001143 0.003291 0.347386 0.7296
ROA^2 3.584426 4.463679 0.803020 0.4254
SIZE^2 -8.12E-06 3.11E-05 -0.260968 0.7951
HEADQUARTERS^2 0.004808 0.002406 1.998159 0.0506
R-squared 0.099151     Mean dependent var 0.004182
Adjusted R-squared 0.002631     S.D. dependent var 0.006151
S.E. of regression 0.006143     Akaike info criterion -7.242696
Sum squared resid 0.002113     Schwarz criterion -7.004569
Log likelihood 235.1449     Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.149039
F-statistic 1.027263     Durbin-Watson stat 1.994403
Prob(F-statistic) 0.417390
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 0.477432     Prob. F(5,57) 0.7916
Obs*R-squared 2.532383     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.7716
Scaled explained SS 1.974611     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.8526
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:35
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.001678 0.011180 -0.150073 0.8812
CAPADEQ^2 -0.025074 0.111717 -0.224442 0.8232
DEBT_TA^2 0.001624 0.011899 0.136450 0.8919
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__^2 0.000853 0.003042 0.280370 0.7802
ROA^2 1.521236 4.147490 0.366785 0.7151
SIZE^2 3.00E-05 2.82E-05 1.064226 0.2917
R-squared 0.040197     Mean dependent var 0.004015
Adjusted R-squared -0.043997     S.D. dependent var 0.005587
S.E. of regression 0.005708     Akaike info criterion -7.403359
Sum squared resid 0.001857     Schwarz criterion -7.199251
Log likelihood 239.2058     Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.323082
F-statistic 0.477432     Durbin-Watson stat 1.635638
Prob(F-statistic) 0.791587
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Jarque-Bera test for normality 
 
1. Regression 1 – CAR (-1, 1) in 3-day event window 
 
 
 
2. Regression 2 – CAR (0, 1) in 3-day event window 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1 63
Observations 63
Mean       3.48e-17
Median   0.019546
Maximum  0.134049
Minimum -0.304153
Std. Dev.   0.079439
Skewness  -1.695185
Kurtosis   6.646861
Jarque-Bera  65.08481
Probability  0.000000
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Mean       3.00e-17
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Minimum -0.333241
Std. Dev.   0.084416
Skewness  -1.842271
Kurtosis   7.629992
Jarque-Bera  91.90830
Probability  0.000000
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3. Regression 3 – CAR (-2, 2) in 9-day event window 
 
 
 
4. Regression 4 – CAR (-4, 4) in 9-day event window 
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Std. Dev.   0.065184
Skewness  -0.062259
Kurtosis   3.129243
Jarque-Bera  0.084548
Probability  0.958607
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5. Regression 5 – CAR (-2, 4) in 9-day event window 
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Jarque-Bera  0.024761
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Ramsey RESET test for linearity 
1. Regression 1 – CAR (-1, 1) in 3-day event window 
 
Ramsey RESET Test
Equation: REGRESSION
Specification: CAR C CAPADEQ DEBT_TA DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__
        ROA SIZE
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values
Value df Probability
t-statistic  2.432511  56  0.0182
F-statistic  5.917109 (1, 56)  0.0182
Likelihood ratio  6.328026  1  0.0119
F-test summary:
Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares
Test SSR  0.037390  1  0.037390
Restricted SSR  0.391253  57  0.006864
Unrestricted SSR  0.353863  56  0.006319
LR test summary:
Value df
Restricted LogL  70.67521  57
Unrestricted LogL  73.83922  56
Unrestricted Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 15:10
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.255414 0.333171 -0.766614 0.4465
CAPADEQ 0.276243 0.534827 0.516509 0.6075
DEBT_TA 0.055821 0.287847 0.193927 0.8469
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ 0.068803 0.077858 0.883697 0.3806
ROA -0.078634 2.073402 -0.037925 0.9699
SIZE 0.011346 0.013214 0.858650 0.3942
FITTED^2 -15.38048 6.322884 -2.432511 0.0182
R-squared 0.207978     Mean dependent var -0.068762
Adjusted R-squared 0.123118     S.D. dependent var 0.084889
S.E. of regression 0.079492     Akaike info criterion -2.121880
Sum squared resid 0.353863     Schwarz criterion -1.883754
Log likelihood 73.83922     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.028224
F-statistic 2.450851     Durbin-Watson stat 1.764403
Prob(F-statistic) 0.035626
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2. Regression 2 – CAR (0, 1) in 3-day event window 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test
Equation: REGRESSION2
Specification: CAR C CAPADEQ DEBT_TA DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__
        ROA SIZE
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values
Value df Probability
t-statistic  2.031399  56  0.0470
F-statistic  4.126583 (1, 56)  0.0470
Likelihood ratio  4.479323  1  0.0343
F-test summary:
Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares
Test SSR  0.030322  1  0.030322
Restricted SSR  0.441815  57  0.007751
Unrestricted SSR  0.411492  56  0.007348
LR test summary:
Value df
Restricted LogL  66.84684  57
Unrestricted LogL  69.08650  56
Unrestricted Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 13:14
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.228149 0.368909 -0.618444 0.5388
CAPADEQ -0.080759 0.498534 -0.161993 0.8719
DEBT_TA 0.026228 0.311053 0.084319 0.9331
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ 0.087406 0.104914 0.833123 0.4083
ROA 0.467730 2.115533 0.221093 0.8258
SIZE 0.014105 0.016922 0.833565 0.4081
FITTED^2 -13.43145 6.611921 -2.031399 0.0470
R-squared 0.195792     Mean dependent var -0.076661
Adjusted R-squared 0.109627     S.D. dependent var 0.090845
S.E. of regression 0.085721     Akaike info criterion -1.971000
Sum squared resid 0.411492     Schwarz criterion -1.732874
Log likelihood 69.08650     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.877344
F-statistic 2.272286     Durbin-Watson stat 1.748386
Prob(F-statistic) 0.049391
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3. Regression 3 – CAR (-2, 2) in 9-day event window 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test
Equation: REGRESSION4
Specification: CAR C CAPADEQ DEBT_TA DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__
        ROA SIZE
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values
Value df Probability
t-statistic  2.483348  56  0.0160
F-statistic  6.167016 (1, 56)  0.0160
Likelihood ratio  6.581791  1  0.0103
F-test summary:
Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares
Test SSR  0.028471  1  0.028471
Restricted SSR  0.287009  57  0.005035
Unrestricted SSR  0.258537  56  0.004617
LR test summary:
Value df
Restricted LogL  80.43527  57
Unrestricted LogL  83.72617  56
Unrestricted Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 13:47
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.144864 0.263839 -0.549062 0.5851
CAPADEQ 0.024167 0.409880 0.058960 0.9532
DEBT_TA 0.005303 0.249398 0.021264 0.9831
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ 0.034430 0.057158 0.602367 0.5494
ROA 1.133028 1.575727 0.719051 0.4751
SIZE 0.009221 0.012293 0.750069 0.4564
FITTED^2 -15.32567 6.171373 -2.483348 0.0160
R-squared 0.227723     Mean dependent var -0.055064
Adjusted R-squared 0.144979     S.D. dependent var 0.073482
S.E. of regression 0.067947     Akaike info criterion -2.435751
Sum squared resid 0.258537     Schwarz criterion -2.197625
Log likelihood 83.72617     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.342095
F-statistic 2.752133     Durbin-Watson stat 1.724254
Prob(F-statistic) 0.020485
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4. Regression 4 – CAR (-4, 4) in 9-day event window 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test
Equation: REGRESSION5
Specification: CAR C CAPADEQ DEBT_TA DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__
        ROA SIZE HEADQUARTERS
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values
Value df Probability
t-statistic  2.382468  55  0.0207
F-statistic  5.676151 (1, 55)  0.0207
Likelihood ratio  6.187705  1  0.0129
F-test summary:
Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares
Test SSR  0.024644  1  0.024644
Restricted SSR  0.263438  56  0.004704
Unrestricted SSR  0.238794  55  0.004342
LR test summary:
Value df
Restricted LogL  83.13464  56
Unrestricted LogL  86.22849  55
Unrestricted Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:23
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.130430 0.249558 -0.522644 0.6033
CAPADEQ -0.212332 0.457586 -0.464027 0.6445
DEBT_TA 0.023748 0.246556 0.096319 0.9236
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ 0.036280 0.073671 0.492456 0.6244
ROA 2.279897 1.619859 1.407466 0.1649
SIZE 0.007506 0.013429 0.558950 0.5785
HEADQUARTERS 0.031504 0.033047 0.953310 0.3446
FITTED^2 -9.970123 4.184789 -2.382468 0.0207
R-squared 0.339370     Mean dependent var -0.068629
Adjusted R-squared 0.255290     S.D. dependent var 0.076355
S.E. of regression 0.065892     Akaike info criterion -2.483444
Sum squared resid 0.238794     Schwarz criterion -2.211300
Log likelihood 86.22849     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.376409
F-statistic 4.036266     Durbin-Watson stat 1.746487
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001241
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5. Regression 5 – CAR (-2, 4) in 9-day event window 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test
Equation: REGRESSION6
Specification: CAR C CAPADEQ DEBT_TA DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__
        ROA SIZE
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values
Value df Probability
t-statistic  2.273816  56  0.0268
F-statistic  5.170239 (1, 56)  0.0268
Likelihood ratio  5.563472  1  0.0183
F-test summary:
Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares
Test SSR  0.021382  1  0.021382
Restricted SSR  0.252974  57  0.004438
Unrestricted SSR  0.231592  56  0.004136
LR test summary:
Value df
Restricted LogL  84.41144  57
Unrestricted LogL  87.19317  56
Unrestricted Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: CAR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/02/17   Time: 14:36
Sample: 1 63
Included observations: 63
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.068894 0.234964 -0.293209 0.7704
CAPADEQ -0.082862 0.377304 -0.219615 0.8270
DEBT_TA 0.139296 0.238642 0.583703 0.5618
DOMESTIC_ACCOUNTS__ -0.035646 0.050541 -0.705289 0.4836
ROA 3.103923 1.469392 2.112386 0.0391
SIZE -0.006300 0.009749 -0.646250 0.5208
FITTED^2 -5.232505 2.301200 -2.273816 0.0268
R-squared 0.389188     Mean dependent var -0.070267
Adjusted R-squared 0.323744     S.D. dependent var 0.078201
S.E. of regression 0.064308     Akaike info criterion -2.545815
Sum squared resid 0.231592     Schwarz criterion -2.307689
Log likelihood 87.19317     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.452159
F-statistic 5.946871     Durbin-Watson stat 1.935662
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000074
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Appendix D: Descriptive statistics 
 
CAPADEQ CAR_0_1 CAR_1_1 CAR_2_2 CAR_2_4 CAR_4_4 DEBT_TA DOMESTIC... ROA SIZE
 Mean  0.139387 -0.076661 -0.068762 -0.055064 -0.070267 -0.068629  0.918759  0.760127  0.005967  11.57335
 Median  0.137000 -0.057527 -0.045344 -0.036752 -0.057491 -0.055266  0.926787  0.862200  0.004600  11.64769
 Maximum  0.213900  0.063482  0.070105  0.070707  0.087790  0.072394  0.965463  0.999600  0.035000  14.60813
 Minimum  0.098000 -0.423395 -0.394553 -0.302493 -0.274681 -0.275633  0.697182  0.060000 -0.010000  7.508312
 Std. Dev.  0.025906  0.090845  0.084889  0.073482  0.078201  0.076355  0.043541  0.273309  0.007618  1.866234
 Skewness  0.624114 -1.688520 -1.685497 -0.962980 -0.364715 -0.291859 -2.858946 -1.100586  1.856365 -0.149384
 Kurtosis  2.816422  6.618680  6.347349  4.063134  2.471232  2.638237  13.33680  2.996985  8.207909  2.020880
 Jarque-Bera  4.178409  64.31051  59.24191  12.70388  2.130615  1.237949  366.3024  12.71857  107.3800  2.750841
 Probability  0.123786  0.000000  0.000000  0.001743  0.344622  0.538496  0.000000  0.001731  0.000000  0.252733
 Sum  8.781400 -4.829625 -4.331998 -3.469002 -4.426809 -4.323629  57.88179  47.88800  0.375900  729.1208
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.041609  0.511674  0.446785  0.334772  0.379154  0.361464  0.117541  4.631259  0.003598  215.9354
 Observations  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63
